Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

State of Utah v. Rosa-re : Unknown
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Linda M. Jones; Michael D. Misner; Heather Chesnut; Attorneys for Appellant.
Christine F. Soltis; Assistant Attorney General; Mark Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Rosa-re, No. 20060432 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6494

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

SEP - 3

SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
Established m J 965
Director
F John 11 ill
Chair
D Gilbert At hay
Vice Chair
Ronald Coleman
Past Chair
George W Latimer
Robert Van Sciver
Jimi Mitsunaga

424 East 500 South
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 841
(80 J) 532-5444
FAX (801) 532-0330
EMAIL AdmuvaMlda com

September 3, 2008

Board of Trustees
Philip V Bemal
David M Bown
Gary K Dalton
Dennis C Ferguson
Maria J Garciaz
David T Lake
Erik Luna
Theresa Martinez
Richai d S Shepherd

Ms. Lisa Collins
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140230
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230
Dear Ms. Collins:
Re:

State v. Rosa-Re, Case No. 20060432.

Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant Dennis Rosa-Re
notifies the Utah Court of Appeals of the following pertinent and significant authority:
Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 1203 (2008) (attached hereto).
On March 28, 2008, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Snyder v Louisiana,
128 S.Ct. 1203 (2008), that a prosecutor's reasons for striking a veniremember from the jury
panel constituted discrimination in violation of Balson v. Kentucfo\ 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Snyder pertains to points argued in this case concerning the prosecutor's reasons for striking
veniremembers from the jury panel, and it pertains to review on appeal of the trial court's
ruling. (See Brief of Appellant, dated August 18, 2006, Arguments B. and C, pages 14-18,
20-23, 27-30).

Respectfully yours,

Linda M. Jones
Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, LINDA M. JONES, hereby certify that I have caused an original and 7 copies of
the foregoing to be hand-delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and 4 copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M.
Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114-0854, this 3 _ day of September, 2008.

LINDA M. JONES

Delivered this

day of September, 2008.
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^Snyder v. Louisiana
U.S.La.?2008.
Supreme Court of the United States
Allen SNYDER, Petitioner,
v.
LOUISIANA
No. 06-10119.
Argued Dec. 4, 2007.
DecidedMarchl9,2008.
Background: Defendant was convicted
in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District
Court, Parish of Jefferson, Kernan A.
Hand, J., of first-degree murder and was
sentenced to death. Defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court Of Louisiana, 874
So.2d
739,
affirmed.
Granting
defendant's petition for a writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court, 545 U.S.
1137, 125 S.Ct. 2956, 162 L.Ed.2d 884,
vacated the judgment and remanded for
further consideration. On remand, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, 942 So.2d
484, affirmed. Certiorari was granted.
Holding: The Supreme Court, Justice
Alito, held that prosecutor's proffered
reasons for striking black prospective
juror
were
pretext
for
racial
discrimination.
Reversed and remanded.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,
dissented and filed an opinion.
West Headnotes

© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West.

HI Jury 230 ©^33(5.15)
230 Jury
23011 Right to Trial by Jury
230k30 Denial or Infringement of
Right
230k33 Constitution and
Selection of Jury
230k33f5) Challenges and
Objections
230k33(5.15)
k.
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited
Cases
Batson provides a three-step process for a
trial court to use in adjudicating a claim
that a peremptory challenge was based on
race: (1) a defendant must make a prima
facie showing that a peremptory
challenge has been exercised on the basis
of race; (2) if that showing has been
made, the prosecution must offer a
race-neutral basis for striking the juror in
question; and (3) in light of the parties'
submissions, the trial court must
determine whether the defendant has
shown purposeful discrimination.
121 Criminal Law 110 €^1158.17
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
HOXXIV(O) Questions of Fact
and Findings
110kll58.17 k. Jury Selection.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 11 Okl 158(3))
On appeal of Batson claim, a trial court's
ruling on the issue of discriminatory
intent must be sustained unless it is

Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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clearly erroneous.

even greater importance.

£31 Jury 230 €^33(5.15)

151 Jury 230 €^>33(5.15)

230 Jury
230II Right to Trial by Jury
230k30 Denial or Infringement of
Right
230k33 Constitution and
Selection of Jury
230k33(5) Challenges and
Objections
230k33(5.15)
k.
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited
Cases
Step three of the Batson inquiry involves
an evaluation of the prosecutor's
credibility, and the best evidence of
discriminatory intent often will be the
demeanor of the attorney who exercises
the challenge.

230 Jury
230II Right to Trial by Jury
230k30 Denial or Infringement of
Right
230k33 Constitution and
Selection of Jury
230k33(5) Challenges and
Objections
230k33(5.15)
k.
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited
Cases
In evaluating Batson claims, the trial
court must evaluate not only whether the
prosecutor's
demeanor
belies
a
discriminatory intent, but also whether
the juror's demeanor can credibly be said
to have exhibited the basis for the strike
attributed to the juror by the prosecutor.

1 £ Jury 230 €^33(5.15)
I £ Jury 230 €^33(5.15)
230 Jury
230II Right to Trial by Jury
230k30 Denial or Infringement of
Right
230k33 Constitution and
Selection of Jury
230k33(5) Challenges and
Objections
230k33(5.15)
k.
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited
Cases
In evaluating Batson claims, race-neutral
reasons for peremptory challenges often
invoke a juror's demeanor, such as
nervousness or inattention, making the
trial court's first-hand observations of

230 Jury
230II Right to Trial by Jury
230k30 Denial or Infringement of
Right
230k33 Constitution and
Selection of Jury
230k33(5) Challenges and
Objections
230k33(5.15)
k.
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited
Cases
Prosecutor's proffered reasons for striking
black prospective juror in capital murder
trial, that prospective juror was nervous
during voir dire and that he might have
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been motivated to find defendant guilty of
lesser included offense to obviate the
need for a penalty phase and thereby
minimize the student teaching hours he
would miss, were pretext for racial
discrimination; prospective juror, after
being informed during voir dire that the
court had contacted his dean, who
informed the court that he would work
with the prospective juror to see that he
was able to make up any student-teaching
time that he missed due to jury service,
did not express any further concern about
serving on the jury, prosecutor had
anticipated on the record during voir dire
that trial would be brief, trial and penalty
phase were completed two days after
prospective juror was struck, and
prosecutor accepted white jurors who
disclosed conflicting obligations that
were at least as serious as black
prospective juror.
121 Criminal Law 110 €^>1134.38
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
llOXXIVfL) Scope of Review in
General
llOXXIVfLH Scope of Inquiry
110kll34.38
k.
Summoning, Impaneling, or Selection of
Jury. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 11 Okl 134(5))
Jury 230 €^33(5.15)
230 Jury
230II Right to Trial by Jury
230k30 Denial or Infringement of

Right
230k33 Constitution and
Selection of Jury
230k33(5) Challenges and
Objections
230k33(5.15)
k.
Peremptory Challenges. Most Cited
Cases
In considering a Batson objection, or in
reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson
error, all of the circumstances that bear
upon the issue of racial animosity must be
consulted.
*1204 Syllabus

m

FN* The syllabus constitutes no
part of the opinion of the Court but
has been prepared by the Reporter
of Decisions for the convenience
of the reader. See United States v.
Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200
U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50
L.Ed. 499.
During voir dire in petitioner's capital
murder case, the prosecutor used
peremptory strikes to eliminate black
prospective jurors who had survived
challenges for cause. The jury convicted
petitioner and sentenced him to death.
Both on direct appeal and on remand in
light of Miller-El v. Dretke. 545 U.S. 231,
125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196, the
Louisiana Supreme Court rejected
petitioner's claim that the prosecution's
peremptory strikes of certain prospective
jurors, including Mr. Brooks, were based
on race, in violation of Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712,
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90 L.Ed.2d 69.
Held: The trial judge committed clear
error in rejecting the Batson objection to
the strike of Mr. Brooks. Pp. 1207 - 1212.
(a) Under Batson's three-step process for
adjudicating claims such as petitioner's,
(1) a defendant must make a prima facie
showing that the challenge was based on
race; (2) if so, " 'the prosecution must
offer a race-neutral basis for striking the
juror in question' "; and (3) " 'in light of
the parties' submissions, the trial court
must determine whether the defendant
has shown purposeful discrimination.'
" Miller-El supra, at 277, 125 S.Ct. 2317
(THOMAS, J., dissenting) (quoting
*U05Miller- El v. Cockrell 537 U.S.
322, 328-329, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154
L.Ed.2d 931).
Unless it is clearly
erroneous, the trial court's ruling must be
sustained on appeal. The trial court's role
is pivotal, for it must evaluate the
demeanor of the prosecutor exercising the
challenge and the juror being excluded.
Pp. 1207 - 1208.
(b) While all of the circumstances bearing
on the racial-animosity issue must be
consulted in considering a Batson
objection or reviewing a ruling claimed to
be a Batson error, the explanation given
for striking Mr. Brooks, a college senior
attempting to fulfill his student-teaching
obligation, is insufficient by itself and
suffices for a Batson error determination.
Pp. 1208-1212.
(1) It cannot be presumed that the trial

court credited the prosecution's first
race-neutral reason, that Mr. Brooks
looked nervous. Deference is owed to a
trial judge's finding that an attorney
credibly relied on demeanor in exercising
a strike, but here, the trial judge simply
allowed
the
challenge
without
explanation. Since Mr. Brooks was not
challenged until the day after he was
questioned and thus after dozens of other
jurors had been called, the judge might
not have recalled his demeanor. Or he
may have found such consideration
unnecessary, instead basing his ruling on
the second proffered reason for the strike.
Pp. 1208 - 1209.
(2)
That
reason-Mr.
Brooks'
student-teaching obligation-fails even
under the highly deferential standard of
review applicable here. Mr. Brooks was 1
of more than 50 venire members
expressing concern that jury service or
sequestration would interfere with work,
school, family, or other obligations.
Although he was initially concerned
about making up lost teaching time, he
expressed no further concern once a law
clerk reported that the school's dean
would work with Mr. Brooks if he missed
time for a trial that week, and the
prosecutor did not question him more
deeply about the matter. The proffered
reason must be evaluated in light of the
circumstances that the colloquy and law
clerk report took place on Tuesday, the
prosecution struck Mr. Brooks on
Wednesday, the trial's guilt phase ended
on Thursday, and its penalty phase ended
on Friday. The prosecutor's scenario-that
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Mr. Brooks would have been inclined to
find petitioner guilty of a lesser included
offense to obviate the need for a penalty
phase-is both highly speculative and
unlikely. Mr. Brooks would be in a
position to shorten the trial only if most or
all of the jurors had favored a lesser
verdict. Perhaps most telling, the trial's
brevity, which the prosecutor anticipated
on the record during voir dire, meant that
jury service would not have seriously
interfered with Mr. Brooks' ability to
complete his student teaching. The dean
offered to work with him, and the trial
occurred relatively early in the fall term,
giving Mr. Brooks several weeks to make
up the time. The implausibility of the
prosecutor's explanation is reinforced by
his acceptance of white jurors who
disclosed conflicting obligations that
appear to have been at least as serious as
Mr. Brooks'. Under Batson's third stage,
the prosecution's pretextual explanation
gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory intent. There is no need to
decide here whether, in Batson cases,
once a discriminatory intent is shown to
be a motivating factor, the burden shifts
to the prosecution to show that the
discriminatory
factor
was
not
determinative. It is enough to recognize
that a peremptory strike shown to have
been motivated in substantial part by
discriminatory intent could not be
sustained based on any lesser showing by
the prosecution. The record here does not
show that the prosecution would have
pre-emptively challenged Mr. Brooks
based on his nervousness alone, *1206
and there is no realistic possibility that the

subtle question of causation could be
profitably explored further on remand
more than a decade after petitioner's trial.
Pp. 1208- 1212.
942 So.2d 484, reversed and remanded.
ALITCX J., delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and
STEVENS, KENNEDY. SOUTER,
G1NSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined.
THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which SCALIA, J., joined.
Stephen B. Bright, Counsel of Record,
Southern Center for Human Rights,
Atlanta, Georgia, Jelpi P. Picou, Jr.,
Marcia Widder, Capital Appeals Project,
New Orleans, Louisiana, for Petitioner.
Paul D. Connick, Jr., District Attorney,
Jefferson Parish, State of Louisiana,
Terry M. Boudreaux, Counsel of Record,
Assistant District Attorney, Gretna,
Louisiana, for Respondent.For U.S.
Supreme Court briefs, see:2007 WL
2605447 (Pet.Brief)2007 WL 3307731
(Resp .Brief)2007
WL
4218010
(Reply.Brief)
Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of
the Court.
Petitioner Allen Snyder was convicted of
first-degree murder in a Louisiana court
and was sentenced to death. He asks us to
review a decision of the Louisiana
Supreme Court rejecting his claim that
the prosecution exercised some of its
peremptory jury challenges based on
race, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d
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committed clear error in its ruling on a.
Batson objection, and we therefore
reverse.
I
I he crime i w - . 11ch peti; i o n L Y . > as
convicted occurred in August 1995. At
that time, petitioner and his wife, Mary,
had separated, i >n Aueu.st -'- ;i.cy
discussed the possibility of reconciliation,
and Mary agreed to meet with petitioner
•. -1. day. That night, Mary went on a
-jib Howard Wilson. During the
evening, petitioner repeatedly attempted
to page Mary, but she did not respond.. At
oximately 1:30 a m . .•»• August U\
Wilson drove up to the home of Mary's
mother to drop Mar) off. Petitioner was
waiting at the scene armed with a knife.
TI
<* opened the driver's side door of
^on's car and repeatedly stabbed the
occupants, killing Wilson and wounding

The Stale charged petitioner Mim
first-degree murder and sought the death
penalty based on the aggravating
circumstance
that
petitioner
had
knowingly created a risk of death or great
bodily harm to more than one person. See
La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art.
905.4(A)(4) (West Supp.2008).
Voir dire began on Tuesdav August 27,
1996, and proceeded as follows. During
the first phase, the trial court screened the
panel to identify jurors who did not meet
Louisiana's requirements for jury service

sequestration for the du:alion of the trial
would result in extreme hardship, More
;han N) prospective jurors reported thai
they r;u! work,
family.
commitments that would interfere with
jury service. In each of those instances,
the nature of the conflicting commitments
was explored, and some of these jurors
were dismissed. App. 58-164.
Tt

i the next phase, the court randomly
selected panek of 13 potential j in ;*rs *br
Ai^n7 iiinhci
questioning. L . s,
6" 'I he defense and prosecution
addressed each pane! and questioned the
jurors both as a group and indi\ ; dualh ,
At the conclusion of this questioning, the
court ruled on challenges for cause. Then,
the prosecution and the defense were
given the opportunity to use peremptory
challenges (each side had 12) to remove
remaining jurors. The eour continued
thi* process o' calling 13-person panels
•• ' t h e jury was filled. In accordance
-- 1 ouisiana law. the parties were
permitted \(^ exercise "backslrikes." 'I h,u
is, they were allowed \o use their
peremptories \ip until :he tinn uhen the
final j.;ry A:IS sworn and diiss ^ere
permitted to strike jurors whom they had
initially accepted when the jurors' panels
•\--e called. See La.Code Crim. Proc.
.•Aim., Art. 795(b)(1); State v. Taylor,
93-2201, pp. 22-23 (La.2/28/96), 669
So.2d364, 376.
. e prospective jui\ n
-v\ j \ e
.liMieu a-, members oi a panel.
x

:v-.iv

,-f Ui^si 1 Niirvbv ! . k V l e n e e s
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lor cause; 5 of the 36 were black; and all 5
of the prospective black jurors were
eliminated by the prosecution through the
use of peremptory strikes. The jury found
petitioner guilty of first-degree murder
and determined that he should receive the
death penalty.
On direct appeal, the Louisiana Supreme
Court conditionally affirmed petitioner's
conviction. The court rejected petitioner's
Batson claim but remanded the case for a
nunc pro
tunc
determination
of
;
* tioner's competency to stand trial.
.,<»ie v. Snyder, 98-1078 (La.4/14/99),
750 So.2d 832. Two justices dissented
and would have found a Batson violation.
See id, at 866 (Johnson.. T, dissenting),
863 (Lemmon. : . concurring in pari and
dissenting in part;.
o n rjnunu, Lie i:'i,\i woiirl Jmind lhat
petitioner had been competent to stand
trial, and the i *<uisiana Supreme Court
ihat determination. State v.
Snyder, 1998-1078 (La.4/14/04), 874
So.2d 739.
Petitioner petitioned this
Court for a writ of certiorari, and while
his petition was pending, this Court
decided Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S.
231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196
(2005). We then granted the petition,
vacated the judgment, and remanded the
case to the Louisiana Supreme Conn for
further
consideration
in light
of
Miller-El. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 545
U.S. 1137, 125 S.Ct. 2956, 162 L.Ed.2d
884 (2005). On remand, the Louisiana
Supreme Court again rejected Snyder's
Batson claim, this time by a vote of 4 to 3.

484. We again granted certiorari, 551
U.S. ~ ~ , 127 S.Ct. 3004, 168 L.Ed.2d
726 (2007), and now reverse.
II
ill ^at^u.i presides a ;.hree-step process
for a trial court to use in adjudicating a
claim that a peremptory challenge was
based on race:
" ''first, a ueicndant must inuke a puma
facie showing that a peremptory
challenge has been exercised on the
basis of race}; sjecond, if that showing
has K-en made, the prosecutim musi
offer a race-neutral basis for striking the
juror in questionf; and tjhird, in light of
the parties' submissions, the trial court
must determine whether the defendant
has shown purposeful discrimination.'
" Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, at 277[,
125 S.Ct. 23171 (THOMA S. *
dissenting) (quoting
Miller-El
v.
CockrelC537 U.S. 322, 328-3291, 123
S.Ct. 1029, 154L.Ed.2d931H2003)).
i2Jl,3J[4Jj5J < .n appeal, a iriai turn's
ruling on ihi issue -I discrir.nnatory
intent must iv sustained unless i; ^
•ly erroneous. See Hernandez v. New
,.„,v, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859,
114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1990*1208 (plurality
non): id., at 372, 111 S.Ct. 1859
(OVoimoi. ! Soinud In SCALIA T .
concurring in judgment). The trial court
has a pivolai role in evaluating Baison
J
"";ns. Step three of the Baison inquiry
K -. IM <•' 'liuatinn of the nrosecutor's
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128 S.Ct. 1203
1 2 8 S.Ct. 1 2 0 3 , 170 I K l Jtl I i n i l I i 11 w> UN t ,il, I! Jjnil\ i ip Sui

n

' ^ ; n i v . s e e 4 7 6 U . S . , at98, n. 21, 106
S.Ct. 1712, and "the best evidence [of
discriminatory intent] often will be the
.eanor of the attorney who exercises
ihc chaUcnge "Hernandez, 500 U.S., at
365, 111 S.Ct 1859 (plurality opinion).
Tn addition, race-neutral reasons for
vremptory challenges often invoke a
. .n.-r's demeanor (e.g., nervousness,
inattention), making the irial court's
first-hand observations of e\en greater
importance. Ii> *!ii^ situation, the tri;d
court must evaluate not onh whether the
prosecutor's
demeanor
belies
a
• ^'-nrnjnatory intent, but also whether
. - >r!s demeanor can credibly be said
to ha\e exhibited the basis for the strike
attributed to the juror by the prosecutor.
We
have
recognized
that
these
determinations
of
credibility
and
demeanor lie " 'peculiarly within a trial
judge's
province,'
"ibid.
(quoting
Wainwrisht v. Witt 469 U.S. 412, 428,
105 S.Ct 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)),
and we have stated that "in the absence of
exceptional circumstances, we would
.'••?• r ;o |the trial court]." 500 U.S., at
JUO, i i J S.Ct. 1859.
Ill
[6] Petitioner centers his Batson claim on
the prosecution's strikes of two black
jurors, Jeffrey Brooks and Elaine Scott
Because we find that the trial court
committed clear error In overruling
petitioner's Batson objection with respect
to Mr. Brooks, we have no need to
consider petitioner's claim regarding Ms.
Scott
See. r •:• , United States v.

n

Kill.

— 8

nilKDaih liiiinnlO '

Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 ( C.A.9
1994) ("[T]he Constitution
forbids
striking even a single prospective juror
for a discriminatory purpose"); United
States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 105 (C.A.4
1.989); United States v. demons, 843
F.2d 741, 747 (C.A.3 1988); United
States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1086
(C.A.8 1987); United States v. David, 803
F.2dl567, 1571 (C.A.11 1986).
I l l In Miller-El v. Dretke, the Court made
it clear that in considering a Batson
obiecii: JL ur in reviewing a ruling
elanncu iu be Batson error, all of the
circumstances ihat bear upon the M.ie \n
racial animosux must be consulted. 545
U.S., at 239, 125 S.Ct. 2317. Here7as
just one example, if there were persisting
doubts as to the outcome, a court would
be required to consider the strike of Ms.
Scott for the bearing it might have upon
in, strike o( Mr. BrouLv *;• this case.
however, the explanation given u>r the
':r : i :e of Mr Brooks is b\ itself
''mincing and suffices lor the

When defense counsel made a Batson
objection concerning the strike of I\ lr.
Brooks •• -ollcge senior who was
sipuug u; fulfill his student-teaching
nation, the prosecution offered two
la.e-neutral reasons for the strike. The
prosecutor explained:
"I thought about it last night. Number 1,
the main reason is that he looked very
nervous to me throughout
the
J
n\}c^u^)v!L
\:!nii- • " -u ^ one of the

© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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fellows that came up at the beginning
[of voir dire] and said he was going to
miss class. He's a student teacher. My
main concern is for thai reason, ihal
being that he might, to go home quickly,
come back with guilty of a lesser verdict
so there wouldn't be a penally phase.
Those are my two vr:\^:\r< " Ar»n ' f '
Defense
e<>wu>d
disputed
\\<\\
explanations, id., at 444-445. and the trial
judge ruled as follows: "A!! -<Ji: h \
.: lug to allow the challenge, I'm going to
: ; vv the challenge." Id., at 445. We
ass *1209 th e prosecution's two
r iuiiered grounds for striking Mr. Brooks
in turn.

Louisiana Supreme Court was correct ihnt
"nervousness cannot be shown from a
* old transcript, which is why ... the [trial]
j</s evaluation must be given much
deference." 942 So.2d, at 496. As noted
above, deference is especially appropriate
where a trial judge has made a finding
that an attorney credibly relied on
demeanor in exercising a strike. Mere.
however, the record does nol show that
the trial judge actually made a
determination concerning Mr. !J rooks'
demeanor. The trial judge was given two
explanations for the strike. Rather than
•making a specific landing on the record
concerning Mr. Brooks' demeanor, the
trial judge simply allowed, the challenge
without explanation. It is possible that the
judge did not have any impression one

Wei) wi m c

vili-.

voiU,.

inu

'*

.lirOOks"

demeanor. Mr. Bnmks was not
ciia-'ivjnucd until the day alter he was
questioned, an,! h\ thai lime Jo/.ens of
other jurors had. been questioned, Thus,
the trial judge may not have recalled. Mr.
Brooks1 demeanor. Or5 the trial judge may
ha\ e found it unnecessary to consider Mr.
Brooks' demeanor, instead basing his
ruhng complete!) on the second proffered
justification ' * the sirike. : ^ thc^e
reasons, we cannot presume thai (he trial
judge credited the prosecutor'^ assertion
*\ >•. • vii n r. I( a s w a s nervous.
B
The second reason proffered for the strike
of M»* Rrooks-his student-teaching
]
,;• wh~!aiK even under the highly
chiiai standard of review that is
applicable here At the beginning of v/j,y
di!\.

•-•he*

':!..•

>vr

;-•

;

,r

memlx-:-\ne \emre whether p:n
service or sequestration would pose an
extreme hardship, Mr. Brooks was 1 of
more than 50 members of the venire who
expressed concern that jury sei vice or
sequestration would interfere with work,,
school, family, or other obligations.
n Air. brooks came forward, th = •
•w »)g exchange took place:
;. ;. JEFFREY BROOKS: ... I'm a
student ai Southern University, New
Orleans. This is nw last semester. My
major requires me to student teach, and
today I've already missed a half a day.
Tivii k n-H-i -f my-ifs required, for me to
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graduate this semester.
"[DEFENS!
• OUNSE1 ;
Brooks, if you-how mum da\s would
you miss if you were sequestered or- (i* jury? Do you teach every day?

:-..
-- JEFFREY BROOKS:
Actually. 1 spoke to my Dean. Doctor
Tillman, who's
ni\ crsit\
probably right now.
"I"1-

< * • ' . !

..

.._.:,..

b,

MR. JEFFREY UROOkN' Five dnvs
a "' n Is
"'[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Five days
a week.

.vo*
EFFREY BROOKS: Would
you like to speak lo him?
'THE O H

< -. ^ a i i .

"MR. JEFFREY URMOkS: , V11c,I if"; ;
8:30 through 3-01)

"MR. JEFFREY BROOKS: 1 ck n'l
have his card on me.

"[DEFENSE COUNSI-I ;
"
,:
missed this week, is there an> way thai
you could m a k e it np this semester?

"THE COURT: Win don't yoi, give fa
law clerk] his number, give [a law
clerk] his name and we'll ,:r;M liim ".*'

MR. J E F F R E Y B R O O K S : Well, the
first two weeks I observe, the remaining
I begin teaching, so there is something
I'm missing right now that will better
me towards my teaching career.
"[DEFENSE CO! J NSEI ]: Is there
any way that you could make up the
observed observation [sic] that you're
missing today, at another time?
"MR. JEFl-\Ui\ BROOKS, li ma> i>e
possible. I'm ••.'! -^ •/
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. So
that"THE COI.TRT: Ts there anyone we
could call, like a Dean or anything, that
we coi lid sp;v:V <:>?

© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West.

. , -, JEFFREY BROOKS
THE BENCH )r Ann. 102- •'»-.;

LLi-i

dieieaiter, LIK vourt again sp-.uw

"TI IE LAW CLERK: Jeffrey Brooks,
the requirement for his teaching is a
three hundred clock hour observation.
Doctor Tillman at Southern University
said that as long as if s just this week, he
doesn't see that it would cause a
problem with Mr. Brooks completing
his observation time with:! -his
semester.
"(!\IK. BROOk
'HIE BFNCFT)

Claim to Orm. I'S i ,\

\\,.:,

.\i • ; <

* 'i ••' D
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"'i i Si- CUUK I: w c lalked to Doctor
Tillman and he says he doesn't see a
problem as long as it's just this week,
you know, he'll work with you on it.
Okay?
"IV .• N .!!•.}•"!• Ki ^ B k u : -

^ay,

%vlk. JEFFREY HKDUks \.VV\X
THE BENCH)." Id, at 116.
Once Mr. Brooks heard the law clerk's
report about the conversation with Doctor
Tillman, Mr. Brooks did not express any
- -.her concern about serving on the jury,
•'*e prosecution did not choose to
, a liirri more deeply about this
matter.
The colloquy with Mr. Brooks and the
1
-^ clerk's report took place on Tuesday,
•M-1 27; the prosecution, struck Mr.
"<>•* the following day, Wednesday,
August 28; the guilt phase of petitioner's
trial ended the next day, Thursday,
August 29; and the penalty phase was
completed by the en 1 r the week, on
Friday, Angus1 *n.
The prosecutor's second proffered reason
for striking Mr. Brooks must be evaluated
in light of these circumstances. The
prosecutor claimed to be apprehensive
that Mr. Brooks, in order to minimize the
student-teaching hours missed during
jury service, might have been inomated
to find petitioner guih>.
of
f
first-degree murder. ^: . *. t* iesser
included offense because this would
obviate the na- 1 .>' ': pen.iH- "hase

proceeuujg. UUL mis scenario wat HI 5 J:. ;
speculative. Even if Mr. Brooks had
favored a quick resolution, that would not
have necessarily led him u r;iec; A
finding of first-degree murder, if the
majority of jurors had initialh favored a
finding of first-degree murder, Mr.
Brooks' purported inclination might have
led him to agree in order to speed the
deliberations. Only if all or most of the
other jurors had favored the lesser verdict
would Mr. Brooks have been in a position
to shorten the trial by favoring such a
verdict.
Perhaps most telling, the hr. •. .._\ of
petitioner's trial-something that me
prosecui or anticipated on 4:ic r e . *ni
hiring •./;/> dire ll -"-meant that serving on
the jur\ would not have seriously
'V'^fereti with Mr. Brooks' ability to
; plete his required student teaching.
As noted, petitioner's trial was completed
by Friday. August 30. ! f Mr. Brooks, w ho
reported to court and was peremptorily
Menged *1211 on Wednesday, August
sad been permitted to serve, he would
• missed only two additional days of
.onl teaching, Thursday, August 29,
and Friday, August 30. Mr. Brooks' dean
promised to "work with" Mr. Brooks to
see that he was able to make up any
-'Hcnt-teaching time that he missed due
., .arj service; the dean stated that he did
not think that this would be a problem;
and the record contains no suggestion that
Mr. Brooks remained troubled after
hearing the report of the dean's remarks.
In addition, although the record does not
include the academic calendar of IV Ir.
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Brooks' university, it is apparent that the
trial occurred relatively early in the fall
semester. With many weeks remaining in
the term, Mr. Brooks would have needed
to make up no more than an hour or two
per week in order to compensate for the
time that he would have lost due to jury
service. When all of these considerations
are taken into account, the prosecutor's
second proffered justification for striking
Mr. Brooks is suspicious.
FNL See, e.g., App. 98, 105, 111,
121, 130,204.
The implausibility of this explanation is
reinforced by the prosecutor's acceptance
of white jurors who disclosed conflicting
obligations that appear to have been at
least as serious as Mr. Brooks'. We
recognize that a retrospective comparison
of jurors based on a cold appellate record
may be very misleading when alleged
similarities were not raised at trial. In that
situation, an appellate court must be
mindful that an exploration of the alleged
similarities at the time of trial might have
shown that the jurors in question were not
really comparable. In this case, however,
the shared characteristic, i.e., concern
about serving on the jury due to
conflicting obligations, was thoroughly
explored by the trial court when the
relevant jurors asked to be excused for
cause.1*2
FN2. The Louisiana Supreme
Court did not hold that petitioner
had
procedurally
defaulted
reliance on a comparison of the

African-American jurors whom
the prosecution struck with white
jurors whom the prosecution
accepted. On the contrary, the
State Supreme Court itself made
such a comparison. See 942 So.2d
484, 495-496 (2006).
A comparison between Mr. Brooks and
Roland Laws, a white juror, is
particularly striking. During the initial
stage of voir dire, Mr. Laws approached
the court and offered strong reasons why
serving on the sequestered jury would
cause him hardship. Mr. Laws stated that
he was "a self-employed general
contractor," with "two houses that are
nearing completion, one [with the
occupants]
...
moving
in
this
weekend." Id., dkYl^. He explained that,
if he served on the jury, "the people won't
[be able to] move in." Id., at 130. Mr.
Laws also had demanding family
obligations:
"[M]y wife just had a hysterectomy, so
I'm running the kids back and forth to
school, and we're not originally from
here, so I have no family in the area, so
between the two things, it's kind of bad
timing for me." Ibid.
Although these
obligations
seem
substantially more pressing than Mr.
Brooks', the prosecution questioned Mr.
Laws and attempted to elicit assurances
that he would be able to serve despite his
work and family obligations. See ibid.
(prosecutor asking Mr. Laws "[i]f you got
stuck on jury duty anyway ... would you
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try to make other arrangements as best
you could?5'). And the prosecution
declined the opportunity to use a
peremptory strike on Mr. Laws. Id., at
549. If the prosecution had been sincerely
concerned that Mr. Brooks would favor a
lesser verdict than first-degree murder in
order to shorten the trial, it is hard to see
why the prosecution would not have had
at least as much concern regarding Mr.
Laws.
*1212 The situation regarding another
white juror, John Donnes, although less
fully developed, is also significant. At the
end of the first day of voir dire, Mr.
Donnes approached the court and raised
the possibility that he would have an
important work commitment later that
week. Id., at 349. Because Mr. Donnes
stated that he would know the next
morning whether he would actually have
a problem, the court suggested that Mr.
Donnes raise the matter again at that time.
Ibid. The next day, Mr. Donnes again
expressed concern about serving, stating
that, in order to serve, "I'd have to cancel
too many things," including an urgent
appointment at which his presence was
essential. Id., at 467-468. Despite Mr.
Donnes' concern, the prosecution did not
strike him. Id., at 490.
As previously noted, the question
presented at the third stage of the Batson
inquiry is " 'whether the defendant has
shown
purposeful
discrimination.'
" Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S.. at 277,
125 S.Ct. 2317.
The prosecution's
proffer of this pretextual explanation

naturally gives rise to an inference of
discriminatory intent. See id., at 252, 125
S.Ct. 2317 (noting the "pretextual
significance" of a "stated reason [that]
does not hold up"); Purkett v. Elem, 514
U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131
L.Ed.2d834(1995)(pgr curiam) ("At [the
third] stage, implausible or fantastic
justifications may (and probably will) be
found to be pretexts for purposeful
discrimination"); Hernandez, 500 U.S., at
365, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (plurality opinion)
("In the typical peremptory challenge
inquiry, the decisive question will be
whether
counsel's
race-neutral
explanation for a peremptory challenge
should be believed"). Cf. St Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407
(1993) ("[Rejection of the defendant's
proffered [nondiscriminatory] reasons
will permit the trier of fact to infer the
ultimate
fact
of
intentional
discrimination").
In other circumstances, we have held that,
once it is shown that a discriminatory
intent was a substantial or motivating
factor in an action taken by a state actor,
the burden shifts to the party defending
the action to show that this factor was not
determinative. See Hunter v. Underwood,
All U.S. 222, 228, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85
L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). We have not
previously applied this rule in a Batson
case, and we need not decide here
whether that standard governs in this
context. For present purposes, it is
enough to recognize that a peremptory
strike shown to have been motivated in
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substantial part by discriminatory intent
could not be sustained based on any lesser
showing by the prosecution. And in light
of the circumstances here-including
absence of anything in the record
showing that the trial judge credited the
claim that Mr. Brooks was nervous, the
prosecution's description of both of its
proffered
explanations
as
"main
concern[s]," App. 444, and the adverse
inference noted above-the record does not
show that the prosecution would have
pre-emptively challenged Mr. Brooks
based on his nervousness alone. See
Hunter, supra, at 228, 105 S.Ct.
1916.
Nor is there any realistic
possibility that this subtle question of
causation could be profitably explored
further on remand at this late date, more
than a decade after petitioner's trial.

a trial judge's province.5 " Hernandez v.
New York 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct.
1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt 469
U.S. 412, 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d
841 (1985)); Hernandez, supra, at 372,
111 S.Ct. 1859 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in judgment); ante, at 1208."[I]n the
absence of exceptional circumstances, we
[should] defer to state-court factual
findings." Hernandez, 500 U.S., at 366,
111 S.Ct. 1859. None of the evidence in
the record as to jurors Jeffrey Brooks and
Elaine Scott demonstrates that the trial
court clearly erred in finding they were
not stricken on the basis of race. Because
the trial court's determination was a
"permissible view of the evidence," id.,
at 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859,1 would affirm the
judgment of the Louisiana Supreme
Court.

* * *

We therefore reverse the judgment of the
Louisiana Supreme Court and remand the
case for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice THOMAS, with whom Justice
SCALIA joins, dissenting.
Petitioner essentially asks this Court to
second-guess
the
fact-based
determinations*1213 of the Louisiana
courts as to the reasons for a prosecutor's
decision to strike two jurors. The
evaluation of a prosecutor's motives for
striking a juror is at bottom a credibility
judgment, which lies " ' peculiarly within

The Court begins by setting out the
"deferential standard," ante, at 1209, that
we apply to a trial court's resolution of a
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106
S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), claim,
noting that we will overturn a ruling on
the question of discriminatory intent only
if it is "clearly erroneous," ante, at
1208.Under this standard, we "will not
reverse a lower court's finding of fact
simply because we would have decided
the case differently."
Easley v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242, 121 S.Ct.
1452, 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Instead, a
reviewing court must ask "whether, 'on
the entire evidence,5 it is 'left with the
definite and firm conviction that a
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mistake has been committed.' " Ibid.
(quoting United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct
525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)).
The Court acknowledges two reasons
why a trial court "has a pivotal role in
evaluating Batson claims." Ante, at
1208.First, the Court notes that the trial
court is uniquely situated to judge the
prosecutor's credibility because the best
evidence of discriminatory intent" ' often
will be the demeanor of the attorney who
exercises the challenge.' " Ibid, (quoting
Hernandez, supra, at 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859
(plurality opinion)). Second, it recognizes
that the trial court's
"first-hand
observations" of the juror's demeanor are
of "grea[t] importance" in determining
whether the prosecutor's neutral basis for
the strike is credible. Ante, at 1208.
The Court's conclusion, however, reveals
that it is only paying lipservice to the
pivotal role of the trial court. The Court
second-guesses
the
trial
court's
determinations in this case merely
because the judge did not clarify which of
the prosecutor's neutral bases for striking
Mr. Brooks was dispositive. But we have
never suggested that a reviewing court
should defer to a trial court's resolution of
a Batson challenge only if the trial court
made specific findings with respect to
each of the prosecutor's proffered
race-neutral reasons. To the contrary,
when the grounds for a trial court's
decision are ambiguous, an appellate
court should not presume that the lower
court based its decision on an improper

ground, particularly when applying a
deferential standard of review. See
Sprint/United Management Co. v.
Mendelsohn, — U.S. -—, 128 S.Ct. 1140,
1145, 170 L.Ed.2dl.
The prosecution offered two neutral bases
for striking Mr. Brooks: his nervous
demeanor and his stated concern about
missing class. App. 444. The trial court,
in rejecting defendant's Batson challenge,
stated only "All right. I'm going to allow
the challenge. I'm going to allow the
challenge."*1214 Idy at 445. The Court
concedes that "the record does not show"
whether the trial court made its
determination based on Mr. Brooks'
demeanor or his concern for missing
class, ante, at 1209, but then speculates as
to what the trial court might have thought
about Mr. Brooks' demeanor. As a result
of that speculation, the Court concludes
that it "cannot presume that the trial court
credited the prosecutor's assertion that
Mr. Brooks was nervous." Ibid.
Inexplicably, however, the Court
concludes that it can presume that the
trial court impermissibly relied on the
prosecutor's
supposedly
pretextual
concern about Mr. Brooks' teaching
schedule, even though nothing in the
record supports that interpretation over
the one the Court rejects.
Indeed, if the record suggests anything, it
is that the judge was more influenced by
Mr. Brooks' nervousness than by his
concern for missing class. Following an
exchange about whether his desire to get
back to class would make Mr. Brooks
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more likely to support a verdict on a
lesser included offense because it might
avoid a penalty phase, defense counsel
offered its primary rebuttal to the
prosecutor's proffered neutral reasons.
Immediately after argument on the
nervousness point, the judge ruled on the
Baison challenge, even interrupting the
prosecutor to do so:
"MR. VASQUEZ: His main problem
yesterday was the fact that he didn't
know if he would miss some teaching
time as a student teacher. The clerk
called the school and whoever it was
and the Dean said that wouldn't be a
problem. He was told that this would go
through the weekend, and he expressed
that that was his only concern, that he
didn't have any other problems.
"As far as him looking nervous, hell,
everybody out here looks nervous. I'm
nervous.
"MR. OLINDE: Judge, it's"MR. VASQUEZ: Judge, that's-You
know.
"MR. OLINDE:-a question of this: It's a
peremptory challenge. We need 12 out
of 12 people. Mr. Brooks was very
uncertain and very nervous looking
and"THE COURT: All right. I'm going to
allow the challenge. I'm going to allow
the challenge." App. 445.

Although this exchange is certainly not
hard-and-fast evidence of the trial court's
reasoning, it undermines the Court's
presumption that the trial judge relied
solely on Mr. Brooks' concern for missing
school.
The Court also concludes that the trial
court's determination lacked support in
the record because the prosecutor failed
to strike two other jurors with similar
concerns. Ante, at 1211 - 1212. Those
jurors, however, were never mentioned in
the argument before the trial court, nor
were they discussed in the filings or
opinions on any of the three occasions
this case was considered by the Louisiana
Supreme Court.— Petitioner failed to
suggest a comparison with those two
jurors in his petition for certiorari, and
apparently only discovered this "clear
error" in the record when drafting his
brief before this Court. We have no
business overturning a conviction, years
after the fact and after extensive
intervening
litigation,
based
on
arguments not presented to the courts
below. Cf. *Yll5Miller-Elv. Dretke, 545
U.S. 231, 283, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162
L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (THOMAS, J.,
dissenting).
FN* While the Court correctly
observes that the Louisiana
Supreme
Court
made
a
comparison between Mr. Brooks
and unstricken white jurors, that is
true only as to jurors Vicki
Chauffe, Michael Sandras, and
Arthur
Yeager.
1998-1078
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OLa.9/6/06), 942 So.2d 484.
495-496. The Court, on the other
hand, focuses on Roland Laws and
John Donnes, who were never
discussed below in this context.
Because I believe that the trial court did
not clearly err in rejecting petitioner's
Batson challenge with respect to Mr.
Brooks, I also must address the strike of
Ms. Scott. The prosecution's neutral
explanation for striking Ms. Scott was
that she was unsure about her ability to
impose the death penalty. Like the claims
made about Mr. Brooks, there is very
little in the record either to support or to
undermine the prosecution's asserted
rationale for striking Ms. Scott. But the
trial court had the benefit of observing the
exchange between the prosecutor and Ms.
Scott, and accordingly was in the best
position to judge whether the prosecutor's
assessment of her response was credible.
When asked if she could consider the
death penalty, her first response was
inaudible. App. 360. The trial court, with
the benefit of contextual clues not
apparent on a cold transcript, was better
positioned to evaluate whether Ms. Scott
was merely softspoken or seemed hesitant
in her responses. Similarly, a firsthand
observation of demeanor is the only thing
that could give sufficient content to Ms.
Scott's ultimate response-"I think I
could," id., at 361-to determine whether
the prosecution's concern about her
willingness to impose the death penalty
was well founded. Given the trial court's
expertise
in
making
credibility
determinations
and
its
firsthand

knowledge of the voir dire exchanges, it
is entirely proper to defer to its judgment.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment
below.
U.S.La.,2008.
Snyder v. Louisiana
128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175, 76
USLW 4136, 08 Cal. Daily Op. Serv.
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